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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULON R. WEST, )\ 
Plaintiff and AppellanJ~ 
vs. \ Case No. 
TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E. I 9870 
WEST, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent has either willingly misconceived or 
willfully misportrayed the proceedings in the trial 
court; and a reply seems warranted. 
Notwithstanding the court granted a summary 
judgment with respect to construction of, the partner-
ship articles, respondents' counsel insists upon discuss-
ing the case as if there had been a trial of fact issues. 
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He refers at length to estoppel, good faith, reliance 
and fair dealing, none of which were presented to or 
passed upon by the trial court. 
On page 6 of respondents' brief the following state-
ment is found: "Rulon's counsel made no objections to 
any pleadings, admissions, affidavits, exhibits or any 
objections of any kind;" but beginning on page 96 of 
the record, (the hearing in which Judge Ellett granted 
the summary judgment) the following is reported: 
"MR. SCHOENHALS: May we introduce 
that instrument into evidence and have it re-
ceived into the evidence, the actual instrument 
itself that was delivered to Terry West, and 
have it marked and received 1 
"THE COURT: Is it admitted that the sig-
nature of Terry West and Rulon R. West ap-
pears on the document? 
"MR. ROE: It is, but I have some defenses 
to this document your Honor and-well, I will 
move to reconsider. 
"THE COURT: What defenses will you 
have1 
"MR. ROE: Well, I have this defense for one 
thing, that this was-this is supposed to be a 
supplement to this agreement of-this purports 
to be agreement for consideration. This purports 
to be supplement to that agreement of dissolu-
tion. The partnership articles themselves provide 
that in anything other than ordinary day to day 
things that affect the business of the partnership, 
it has to be signed by all three parties unani-
mously. 
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"MR. SCHOENHALS: May we have that 
letter also received into the evidence, your 
Honor? 
"THE COURT: The agreement-
"MR. ROE: I am objecting to all of the evi-
dence introduced here. 
* * * * 
"MR. ROE: I want to state for the record, 
because I think that this record may have to go 
up, Judge-
"THE COURT: Yes, I would expect you to 
take it up. 
"MR. ROE: -and I would like to state my 
position for the record that we have contended 
all along that the addtiional amounts that were 
paid by Rulon R. West to Terry R. West were 
not and never intended to be contributions to 
capital, that they were loans to the partnership, 
and that the evidence in the case of a trial of this 
thing would so show. 
"THE COURT: Well, maybe I had better 
take the bench and let you put your evidence on. 
Do you have a motion before me? 
* * * * 
"MR. ROE: If the record does not support 
my motion for summary judgment and it ap-
pears that there are triable issues of fact, then 
the court should not grant my motion, and they 
should set it up for trial of those triable issues. 
"THE COURT: I think with what he has 
shown me here that I should grant your motion 
for summary judgment and should determine 
that contract means, and I will here-
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"1\tiR. ROE: Well, I'm not-I don,t want to 
put on evidence where there are fact issues. You 
can interrogate counsel and find out what they 
are I think, Judge, and I can tell you what those 
issues are (R. 98, 99). 
* * * * 
"MR. ROE: Well, the partners can loan 
money to the partnership, and the partnership 
act recognizes this. That has a~ways been an issue 
as to what the character of those things are, and 
there just isn't anything in the record at all 
before you now as to what those were except they 
say he's put One Hundred Sixty-two Thousand 
Five Hundred into it. We say he lent the money 
to the partnership. 
"MR. SCHOENHALS: Then you shouldn't 
have moved for summary judgment. 
"MR. ROE: Oh, I can move for summary 
judgment on that because under my construc-
tion of the instrument they don't get anything 
anyway but that doesn,t take away from this case 
fact issues that are there (R. 100) ." [Emphasis 
added.) 
Rulon's counsel consistently objected to the course 
of the proceedings, insisted that it was not a proceeding 
at which evidence should be taken, and asserted through-
out that if there were issues af fact to be tried that the 
matter should be set for trial. Although there is nothing 
in the record, anywhere, to show that counsel consented 
to the trial judge trying the case as a factual matter, 
respondents have treated the case as if it were one that 
had been tried. 
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The hearing was on a motion for summary judg-
ment and the only factual issue before the judge was 
whether there were disputed issues of material fact. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The rule that an appellate court will not reverse 
where there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial 
court's position has no application to a summary judg-
ment. 
In his argument under Point I the respondent doesn't 
cite a single case and makes statements about the law 
and the effects of evidence which are contrary to the 
most rudimentary principles. For instance, it is stated 
that the fact that Rulon "agreed" to file a gift 
tax return constituted an "admission" and showed his 
intention "conclusively," but the statement disproves 
itself because the agreement shows that there was no 
gift. Moreover, an extra-judicial admission is eviden-
tial only, not conclusive, and even if the "supplemental 
agreement" was admissible as evidence of Rulon's in-
tention, the trier of fact would have to ~etermine the 
weight to be given to it on the question of "completed 
gift." 
This court has held again and again that if there 
is dispute as to any material fact a summary judgment 
is not proper. If there had been a trial on the issues and 
if the trial court had then come to certain conclusions 
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with respect to the meaning of certain conduct of 
the parties, respondents might have been correct in 
contendingthat the findings, conclusions-and judgment 
should be upheld if they were supported by sufficient 
evidence. But there was no trial despite the trial court's 
attempt to compel the parties to go to trial eo instanti 
on questions raised in the argument. The appellant, 
as he had a right to do under procedural rules, refused 
a trial at that point, relying upon Rule 56 (c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to the effect that judgment 
will be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact" and a party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
II 
Filing a motion for summary judgment does not 
deprive the moving party of a right to trial of fact issues. 
The respondents argue under Point II that the 
appellant "represented" to the court that there was no 
genuine issue of factl and that this, coupled with the 
circumstance that he had made no denial of an affidavit 
filed in behalf of Terry West, required the lower court 
to accept "all evidence" as true and resolve the issues 
in accordance therewith. 
It is obvious that the court couldn't accept all of 
the evidence as being true because the evidence was 
1. Appellant also "represented" to the court that he was en· 
titled to judgment as a matter of law, but this representation 
apparently wasn't binding on anyone. 
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conflicting, and the conflict had to be resolved by a 
trial. The trial court could not, in a summary judgment 
hearing, choose which evidence was to be believed. Al-
though both parties move for a summary judgment 
there is no implied consent that the court proceed to 
try factual issues. See 6 Moore~s Federal Practice~ 
par. 56.13. 
"The function of a motion for summary judg-
ment is analago~~ to that of a motion for di-
rected verdict. Although all parties move for 
directed verdicts that does not warrant the court 
in withdrawing the case from the jury if there 
is any genuine disputed issue of fact. 
"A parallel principle is applicable to the 
summary judgment procedure. The well-settled 
rule is that cross-motions for summary judgment 
do not warrant the court in granting summary 
judgment unless one of the moving parties is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon 
facts that are not genuinely disputed. 
" ( 1) A party, to be entitled to summary 
judgment, has the burden of showing that the 
facts, which would warrant judgment in his 
favor under applicable substantive law principles 
are indisputable. It does not follow from a 
party~s failure to meet that burden~ that his ad-
versary has satisfied a similar burden as to the 
facts which would entitle the adversary to sum-
mary judgment. * * * 
"(2) There may be no dispute as to the facts 
which would justify judgment for one party on 
a particular legal theory, although there may 
be a dispute as to the facts which would justify 
judgment for the adverse party. * * * 
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"Where, then, it is clear that there is no dis-
pute as to the facts which would justify judg· 
ment for one of the parties, the court may prop-
erly sustain his motion, including an oral motion 
made at the hearing; and, even in the absence of 
a formal motion, may grant summary judgment 
to a party when it is clear what the facts are 
and his adversary has had a fair opportunity 
to dispute them. On the other hand, if it is not 
clearly established that there is. no dispute as to 
the facts which would justify judgment for 
one of the parties, then the court may not prop-
erly grant him judg·ment even though each side 
has moved for summary judgment in its favor. 
And this rule applies whether the case is a 'jury' 
action or a 'court' action." [Emphasis added.) 
The following statement from Begnaud v. White 
( 6 Cir., 1948) 170 F.2d 323, supports and is quoted by 
. Professor Moore: 
"The fact that both parties makes motions for 
summary judgment, and each contends in sup· 
port of his respective motion that no genuine 
issue of fact exists, does not require the court 
to rule that no fact issue exists. * * * Appellant's 
concession that no genuine issue of fact existed 
was made in support of its own motion. for sum· 
mary judgment. We do not think that the con-
cession continues over into the court's separate 
consideration of appellee's motion for summary 
judgment in his behalf after appellant's motion 
was overruled.'' 
See, also, F.A.R. Liquidating Corporation v. 
Brownell (3 Cir., 1954) 209 F.2d 375, another case in 
10 
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which both parties had moved for summary judgment. 
The court said: 
"F.A.R. also. contends that since defendant 
cross-moved for summary judgment, it is now 
precluded from questioning the propriety of 
disposing of -the case upon such a motion. But, 
it is well established that cross-motions for sum-
mary judgmep.t do not warrant the trial court 
granting summary judgment unless one of the 
moving parties is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law upon facts that are not genuinely 
disputed." 
Hycon Manufacturing Company v. H. l(och & 
Sons (9 Cir., 1955), 219 ~..,.2d 353, was an action for 
infringement of letters patent. Upon cross-motions for 
summary judgment the court had before it documentary 
evidence relating to patent infringement; it granted 
summary judgment for plaintiff, made findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, and entered judgment. In re-
versing, the Court of Appeals said: 
"The trial court exceeded the permissible lim-
its of determination of disputed questions with-
out trial. A motion for summary judgment can-
not be granted simply because both sides move 
for . it. An indispensible pre-requisite to such a 
judgment is the absence of a material question 
of fact. But it is obvious that there were postu-
lates of fact involved in the diametrically oppo-
site positions of the respective litigants. Both 
contentions of fact could not be true. 
"It is then said the proof was documentary 
and was all before the trial court. If this were 
conceded, there were still questions of fact to 
11 
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be resolved which an appellate court is not per-
mitted to adjudicate. * * * The existence of the 
basis of fact in documentary form or in agreed 
statement of the parties does not transmute such 
propositions into questions of law." 
We have been unable to find any case in which 
counsel has been estopped from claiming certain facts 
to be in dispute because of a prior statement in a motion 
for summary judgment that there were no genuine 
issues as to material facts.z 
III 
The issues raised by appellant in this case were 
raised before the trial court. 
In point III of their brief, respondents seem to 
say that the only defense raised by Rulon was lack of 
consideration, and that it is now too late to raise any 
other question as to the propriety of the trial court's 
ruling. If that is what they are saying, they are again 
engaged in writing fiction. 
The transcript of the summary judgment hearing 
records appellant's contentions that the "Supplemental 
Agreement" was not effective as a deed of gift because 
it could not be construed as relating to anything except 
"contributions" and did not describe what was sup· 
posed to have been given (R. 98, 99) ; that it purported 
2. The statement is merely formal, in any event. The motion 
for summary judgment incorporated language from Rule 56 and 
set forth the grounds upon which a summary judgment may be 
granted. 
12 
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to be part of a supplemental agreement for considera-
tion (R. 96); that agreed consideration was never de-
livered (R. 102); and that Rulon was induced by the 
undue influence of Terry's lawyer to sign the "supple-
mental agreement" at a time when the lawyer knew 
plaintiff, under great pressure, was in a hurry to make 
an important trip (R. 102). The contention was made 
clear to the trial court that the "supplemental agree-
ment" was not good as a contract because there is no 
consideration, and not good as a gift because there 
was no adequate description of the property being 
given. Moreover, there was no donative intention since 
the instrument shows on its face, and the affidavit and 
answer of Terry show on their faces, that the docu-
ment was one part of a larger transaction entered into 
with respect to dissolution of the partnership. The 
defenses (except undue influence) were also raised by 
Rulon's reply to Terry's counterclaim (R. 32, 33). 
Questions as to construction of the articles of partner-
ship were raised by the complaint. 
IV 
Terry~s affidavit cannot be accepted as proof of 
disputed facts. 
Respondents place a greater reliance on Terry's 
affidavit than is warranted by the affidavit itself, the 
law relating to affidavits, or Terry's lack of credibility 
as demonstrated by his deposition. The summary judg-
ment was entered by the trial court on the basis of 
13 
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depositions, interrogatories, and pleadings in the file 
(R. 107), as well as the affidavit. Terry could not, by 
filing an affidavit, escape from the testimony recorded 
in his deposition, and establish as "admitted" factual 
matters which had been expressly denied by Rulon in 
his deposition. The affidavit's only purpose was to show 
the existence or non-existence of a dispute as to material 
facts. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the third 
circuit in F.A.R. Liquidating Corp. v. Brownell~ 209 
F.2d 379, cited supra: 
"F.A.R. argues on appeal, however, that there 
is not the slightest doubt that Fernseh's June 
14th cable was dispatched prior to 1:10 p.m. 
As 'clearly proving' this contention F.A.R. re-
lies heavily on a detailed affidavit from an expert 
from R.C.A. Communications, Inc., wherein the 
opinion is rendered that the cable was trans-
mitted before 1 :10 p.m. on June 14. But, al-
though an affidavit filed in support of a motion 
for summary judgment may be considered for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether an issue of 
fact is presented, it cannot be used as a basis 
for deciding the fact issue. Frederick Hart & Co. 
v. Recordgraph Corp.~ 3rd Cir., 1948, 169 F.2d 
580. In addition, it is obvious from a reading 
of the affidavit that it is nothing more than an 
opinion. Summary judgment on such evidence 
is improper." 
The above statement of the rule is consonant with 
the language of the rule itself respecting the require-
ments for affidavits. Rule 56 (e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides: 
14 
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"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated there-
in. * * * " 
Terry's affidavit is filled with conclusions, opinions, 
and hearsay declarations, and there is no showing ( af-
firmative or otherwise) that Terry was competent. For 
example, he states that his agreement to sign the dis-
solution was "conditioned" upon Rulon signing the 
agreement identified as Exhibit No. 1; that plaintiff 
"understood and agreed" that Exhibit 1 constituted 
a transfer; that plaintiff "verified" the fact to another 
member of the family; that plaintiff "indicated" that 
he would receive back only 40%; that it was the "inten-
tion" of plaintiff and defendant and that both parties 
"understood and agreed" that the distribution would 
be in a certain way; that it was "the intention of the 
parties" that, should the partnership be terminated, 
distribution would be as contended by the respondent 
-and so on. The statements contained in the affidavit 
would be completely inadequate to support a summary 
judgment even if most of them were not controverted 
by other statements of fact contained in the depositions 
of Terry R. West, Flora E. West and Rulon R. West 
-which they in fact are. 
15 
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CONCLUSION 
The respondents were not entitled to summary 
judgment. There is evidence that the original partner-
ship agreement was prepared by Terry R. West, a fact 
which would be considered by the trier of fact in resolv-
ing any ambiguities in the agreement. The contempo-
raneous construction by the parties themselves is also 
an important fact. A fact-trier would have to consider 
the fact that capital accounts were carried for Rulon 
R. West and Flora E. West and Terry R. West in 
the accounting system set UP. by Terry; that amounts 
paid into, or lent, to the partnership by Rulon were 
credited to him, and were not transferred by Terry to 
himself and Flora until there was a falling out. More· 
over, all amounts lent to the partnership by Flora were 
paid back by Terry, with interest at 8<fo. (R. 53). 
With respect to the dissolution agreement, there 
are questions of fact as to the signing of the agreement 
by Flora, whether the agreement ever became effective, 
and the negotiations bearing upon construction of the 
term "liabilities to partners" in the portions of the 
agreement requiring repayment of such liabilities prior 
to distribution of the "net assets." 
With respect to the so-called supplemental agree· 
ment there are questions of fact relating to the intention 
of the parties in signing it; whether part of the agree· 
ment was for Terry to buy Rulon's interest within a 
specified time after signing of the supplemental agree· 
ment; whether it was intended to be part of the disso· 
16 
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lution agreement; whether it was ever acquiesced in 
by Flora prior to the time it was repudiated by Rulon; 
whether Terry's attorney exerted undue influence on 
Rulon in getting him to sign the agreement in the first 
place. 
In the trial court Rulon contended that the part-
nership agreement was clear enough, particularly in 
light of the contemporaneous construction by the 
parties, that the court would have to conclude that the 
40-40-20 distribution would be of the assets of the 
partnership remaining after "winding up" of the part-
nership and the payment of all partnership liabilities, 
including liabilities to partners. 
The so-called supplemental agreement signed by 
Rulon and Terry (but not by Flora) is consistent with 
this construction. Whether Terry and Flora receive 
all contributions of Rulon, or only the initial contri-
butions, or whether they only receive a share of profits, 
it could be treated by the parties as a ''gift'' under the 
terms of the supplemental agreement. But that agree-
ment never did define what was being "given." It 
referred to the "contributions"-whatever they were. 
The court through some kind of wizardry was able 
to find in that agreement a gift to Terry West and 
Flora West all of the moneys that had ever been put 
into the partnership, by way of contribution, loan, ad-
. vancement, or what have you, from the beginning of 
the partnership to the date of the agreement by Rulon 
-all without any trial with respect to the circumstances 
17 
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under which the agreement was signed and the intention 
of the parties in signing it. 
We submit that the case should be reversed and 
the court directed to enter judgment that distribution 
of the partnership assets on a 40-40-20 basis should 
not be made until repayment of all liabilities to the 
partners, particularly contributions to capital and loans 
to the partnership, as well as interest earned by the 
capital contributions and loans. If the court feels that 
the agreement is not clear enough in this respect, the 
case should nevertheless be sent back to the trial court 
for a trial of issues relating to construction of the 
agreement and the dissolution agreement, and the cir-
cumsta~ces under which the so-called supplemental 
agreement was signed by two of the three partners. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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